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Abstract—It is a common narrative that blockchains are
immutable and so it is technically impossible to erase data stored
on them. For legal and ethical reasons, however, individuals and
organizations might be compelled to erase locally stored data,
be it encoded on a blockchain or not. The common assumption
for blockchain networks like Bitcoin is that forcing nodes to
erase data contained on the blockchain is equal to permanently
restricting them from participating in the system in a full-node role.
Challenging this belief, in this paper, we propose and demonstrate
a pragmatic approach towards functionality-preserving local
erasure (FPLE). FPLE enables full nodes to erase infringing
or undesirable data while continuing to store and validate most
of the blockchain. We describe a general FPLE approach for
UTXO-based (i. e., Bitcoin-like) cryptocurrencies and present a
lightweight proof-of-concept tool for safely erasing transaction
data from the local storage of Bitcoin Core nodes. Erasing nodes
continue to operate in tune with the network even when erased
transaction outputs become relevant for validating subsequent
blocks. Using only our basic proof-of-concept implementation,
we are already able to safely comply with a significantly larger
range of erasure requests than, to the best of our knowledge, any
other full node operator so far.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years since the birth of Bitcoin [23], [26], worldwide
enthusiasm for its technological approach is still at a high.
Decentralized networks maintaining append-only ledgers, or
blockchain networks, capture the imagination and are heralded
as solutions to decade-old challenges of trust and control.
Blockchain networks depend on a healthy population of full
nodes, i. e. individual peers that store, verify and distribute the
full set of data comprising the blockchain—the history of all
past transactions. And blockchains are commonly advertised
as being immutable, making it impossible to change or erase
already posted data. Consequently, potential node operators
today face a binary choice: deploy a full node, contribute to
overall network resilience, and store all the data that anyone
ever added to the blockchain—or participate as a light client
with reduced security and privacy [13]. Blockchains can and do
hold arbitrary information in addition to financial transactions,
though. And there is a wide spectrum of legal and ethical
reasons why individual node operators might refuse to store
and distribute certain data. Even one inappropriate transaction
might flip the above decision [20], [3].
Is a third way possible? Can we give potential node operators
stronger options to contribute, keeping the network healthy,
while still complying with local regulation and individual
values? We support this view and argue that a more thorough
discussion of local erasure in existing popular blockchain
networks such as Bitcoin is overdue. We propose the concept
of functionality-preserving local erasure (FPLE)—a pragmatic
solution to the challenge of locally erasing data that is
potentially consensus-critical in the future while retaining core
full node functions and benefits. In contrast to previous erasure
proposals [2], [16], [9], FPLE requires no protocol changes and
is fully compatible with existing UTXO-based (i. e., Bitcoin-
like) networks without causing forks or introducing new points
of trust. While FPLE enables only the local erasure of data,
we argue that this is a necessary building block for enabling
global erasure without introducing significant changes to the
existing trust model.
As a proof-of-concept, we implemented a prototypic tool for
operators of Bitcoin full nodes. Our tool enables the erasure
of transaction outputs from the local data stores of Bitcoin
Core nodes, while enabling the nodes to stay in sync with the
network even if the erased outputs are later spent. This does
not require any changes to the node software itself or to the
Bitcoin protocol. Our tool is thoroughly tested against current
Bitcoin Core versions and enables us to safely comply with a
larger range of erasure requests than previously possible for
node operators.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• A pragmatic and individually deployable approach towards
functionality-preserving local erasure (FPLE) that provides
solutions for challenges such as the erasure of potentially
consensus-critical data (Sec. III).
• A proof-of-concept tool that demonstrates the feasibility
of applying FPLE to existing Bitcoin nodes (Sec. IV).
• A thorough discussion of legal and non-legal reasons for
local erasure (Sec. V) and of potential implications of
FPLE when applied to existing networks (Sec. VI).
II. RELATED WORK
It is no secret that arbitrary data can be included on
blockchains—generic non-financial data was included as early
as in Bitcoin’s genesis block. Non-financial data storage on
blockchains enables innovative new services such as name
services1, timestamping2, pseudonymous identities [12] and
non-equivocation logging [25] (to name just a few examples).
Recent results, however, demonstrate that an uncensorable data
storage service like Bitcoin can also be abused, respectively
that some of the data stored on it might not be universally well
looked upon [20]. A range of solutions exist for alleviating
this conflict. They can be grouped into the categories: avoiding
the inclusion of unwanted data, allowing the modification (and
erasure) of past blockchain state, and local pruning. FPLE can
1https://www.namecoin.info/
2https://opentimestamps.org/
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be seen as an improvement to local pruning. Most importantly,
we aim at solving the data erasure challenge node-locally
instead of on a global level.
A. Avoiding Unwanted Data
In [19], Matzutt et al. discuss various approaches for
preventing the insertion of arbitrary, potentially unwanted
data onto cryptocurrency blockchains. Their proposals include
content detectors, which filter transactions based on heuristics
and knowledge about commonly used data insertion methods,
as well as protocol modifications that would greatly increase
the costs of including arbitrary data. Approaches along these
lines have also surfaced in the non-academic cryptocurrency
community3. Approaches for avoiding the insertion of unwanted
data depend on global adoption, for an effective filtering,
and in some cases also on protocol changes when applied
to existing networks. In contrast, FPLE requires only a node-
local decision and is in this way both more practical and
enables the incorporation of a wider range of individual
preferences and constraints. Lastly, as can be seen in related
application domains such as malware detection or digital
rights protection via upload filtering, content-based filtering is
never completely circumvention-proof. Once something "slips
through", an erasure possibility again becomes necessary.
When considering data protection as a reason for erasure (cf.
Sec. V-B), it also noteworthy that a large body of works deal
with the challenge of providing anonymity to blockchain users
(see e. g. [7] for a recent survey). However, most transactions in
popular systems like Bitcoin do not use any additional means
of increasing anonymity [22] and are reidentifiable using well-
known techniques [7]. Even when strong privacy guarantees can
be achieved through technical means, this provides no solution
for cases where identifiable data is posted to the blockchain
on purpose, e. g., as part of doxing.
B. Redacting the Blockchain
A straightforward approach to globally erasing previously
included data from a blockchain is to produce a hard fork [2].
Safe hard forks require a strong off-chain consensus among
miners, users and network operators. In public networks with
little central coordination, such as Bitcoin, such a consensus is
notoriously difficult to achieve. Even more so when compared
to the ease of including potentially problematic data at a
high rate. Redactable blockchains [2] have been proposed
as an alternative blockchain design that allows the global
erasure of data without causing hard forks. They use chameleon
hash functions [5] that enable trusted entities with access
to a trapdoor key to calculate hash collisions and therefore
change published data while maintaining the appearance of
chain integrity. Alternative solutions were proposed that deal
with resulting trust problems by employing a voting-like
approach [16], [9]. However, [2], [16] and [9] require heavy
changes to existing systems, also altering their underlying trust
model. In contrast to their motivation of erasing data globally,
we focus on local erasure without requiring protocol changes.
3 See, e. g.: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bitcoin.devel/1996
C. Pruning
Pruning is a widely used technique for locally erasing older
parts of a blockchain, mainly with the goal of reducing storage
requirements. While related, our local erasure approach differs
in its goal—we erase individual data chunks instead of the
whole history before a certain point—and provides solutions for
outstanding challenges such as the pruning of data potentially
relevant for validating future blocks. The latter challenge is
highly relevant in practice as problematic data is often encoded
in unspent but potentially spendable transaction outputs [20].
Alternative blockchain designs such as [6] propose storing
the current global state, e. g., in terms of account balances, in
each block so that older blocks can be more safely pruned.
A per-block cryptographic commitment to the current state is
also used in popular networks such as Ethereum [27]. While
potentially making past transactions more easily prunable,
neither of these solutions help in cases where potentially
unwanted data can be reconstructed from the current state,
such as when it is encoded in account addresses or smart
contract data. With FPLE, we explicitly consider the erasure
of data that is part of the UTXO set, the equivalent of "state"
in UTXO-based systems.
III. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO ERASURE
In the following, we present a specific proposal towards
functionality-preserving local erasure (FPLE). We propose
FPLE as an extension to existing node software for common
blockchain networks like Bitcoin. FPLE enables individual node
operators to mark chunks of data (e. g., transaction outputs)
for erasure without requiring protocol changes, coordination
with other nodes or the introduction of global trust anchors.
In Sec. IV, we even show how, when targeting Bitcoin, core
benefits of our approach can be reaped without making changes
to the actual node software. For enabling a more concise
description, we focus on erasure from UTXO-based (i. e.,
Bitcoin-like) blockchains and of data stored in transaction
outputs. Transaction outputs are the most heavily used data
storage location in Bitcoin [20] and one of the most challenging
when it comes to functionality-preserving erasure. We give an
overview over possible data storage locations in Sec. III-B,
after first giving an overview over our general approach.
A. Basic Approach
With FPLE, chunks of data marked for erasure are physically
erased from storage or garbled, never again stored in a
reconstructable form, and never shared with other nodes.
Conceptually, references to erased data are stored in an erasure
database, to avoid requesting unwanted data in the future,
filtering it upon renewed receipt and being able to differentiate
non-existent data from erased data.
For dealing with possible validation challenges following
the erasure of data chunks, a set of pragmatic workarounds
is proposed. Namely, we employ the following principles
whenever validation steps depend on portions of erased data:
1) Nodes ignore and never relay unconfirmed transactions
whose validation depends on erased data.
2) If a transaction depending on erased data is included on
the blockchain, erasing nodes assume that the verification
operations relating to the erased data finished positively.
In essence, for the subset of transactions and blocks for
which validation directly depends on raw erased data (and
only for that subset), the erasing node assumes a mode of
validation akin to the simplified payments verification (SPV)
paradigm—it trusts that miners are sufficiently incentivised to
mine valid blocks. We focus on this simple and universally
applicable approach to prove our point that erasure from
blockchain nodes is not an impossibility. However, we also
discuss ideas towards fully eliminating the need for an SPV
fallback (in Sec. III-F). In the following, building upon an
abstract model of UTXO-based blockchain protocols, we further
specify our proposals for erasure and validation and discuss
potential security implications of our design. In Sec. IV we
then introduce a lightweight proof-of-concept implementation
of FPLE for Bitcoin Core.
B. UTXO-based Blockchain Protocols
We introduce our FPLE approach based on an abstract
model of UTXO-based blockchain protocols inspired by the
description in [26]. We focus on the aspects of UTXO-based
blockchain protocols that are most relevant for the storage and
erasure of arbitrary data, namely the defining data structures
and their fields, and the mechanisms of validation (as they
might depend on erased data).
As will be of little surprise to the reader, blockchains are
built of blocks, as also depicted in Fig. 1. We model a block
as consisting of one block header and a set of transactions
Tx. Block hashes are formed by cryptographically hashing
the content of block headers. Block headers include the hash
of the preceding block in the chain (PrevBlockHash),
a cryptographic commitment to the set of transactions in
the block (typically the root of a Merkle tree formed from
transaction hashes, hence MerkleRoot), a timestamp (Time)
and different types of MiningData depending on the used
consensus algorithm. In the case of a proof-of-work system,
for example, this abstract data field would include a nonce
found by miners. In a permissioned system, a miner’s signature
might be included.
Figure 1. Block data fields.
The model we used for transactions is depicted in Fig. 2.
Transactions are typically identified by a transaction identi-
fier (TXID) identical to a cryptographic hash of the transaction,
i. e., txHash. Transactions can include a lockTime value
that encodes the earliest time that the transaction is allowed
to be included in a block. The main part of most transactions
is, however, comprised of their inputs and outputs. Outputs
encode value units of cryptocurrency that can be spent,
with a scriptPubKey encoding prerequisites for doing
so (typically based on forming a correct signature with a
predefined public key). Inputs include a reference to outputs of
previous transactions and include a solution to output scripts
via the scriptSig field. Transaction outputs can be used in
such a way only once, allowing them to be differentiated into
spent and unspent transaction outputs, STXOs and UTXOs.
Figure 2. Transaction data fields.
Note that for simplicity, our model does not explicitly
consider recent developments such as Segregated Witness (Seg-
Wit) [18]. We argue that this is without loss of generality.
For example, while SegWit introduces a new witness structure
holding data complementary to scriptSig but stored outside
of transactions, the witness structure can also be modelled
as a part of scriptSig without distorting the general
discussion of FPLE. In Sec. IV, we focus more on SegWit
specifically when discussing challenges related to the practical
implementation of FPLE.
We assume that blocks are validated sequentially starting
from the genesis block (until reaching the current blockchain
"tip"). Validation includes checks such as:
• Is PrevBlockHash the hash of the previous block?
• Taking MiningData into account, have the mining
prerequisites4 been met?
• Does MerkleRoot match the set of transactions?
• Are all included transactions valid?
The validation of transactions is based on checks such as:
• Do all input scripts satisfy the output scripts they refer-
ence?
• Are all referenced outputs unspent?
• Do the value fields add up correctly5?
• Has lockTime passed already?
For simplicity, we assume that once a block has been
processed and deemed correct, it is not validated again.
Blockchains are per design append-only, with the validation
conditions of a block depending only on data included in
previous blocks or the block itself. Consequently, data which
4 Such as the current difficulty target, when using proof-of-work.
5 Also taking current fee rates into account.
won’t be needed for validating subsequent blocks can be safely
and trivially erased, or pruned, after it has been validated and
enough blocks have been included on top of if to make a
successful fork preceding the block unlikely (s.a. Sec. II-C). In
our model as well as in popular networks such as Bitcoin, such
non-future-relevant data fields include raw block data (after
future-relevant data items have been stored in other forms such
as an UTXO database), STXOs and provably unspendable
outputs6. On the other hand, future-relevant data fields, i. e.,
data potentially needed for the validation of yet unprocessed
(or unmined) blocks, include block hashes (relevant, e. g., for
the immediately following block), UTXOs (including their
respective transaction IDs) and, in general, lock times.
A central contribution of our paper is the proposal and
functional evaluation of a backwards-compatible approach to
the safe erasure of future-relevant data fields. We base the
subsequent discussion on the challenge of erasing transaction
parts, with a special focus on the erasure of data stored in output
scripts (scriptPubKey). Erasing from output scripts is both
challenging, as they are future-relevant, and highly relevant, as
output scripts are the most commonly used storage location for
arbitrary data in Bitcoin [20] (and likely other networks). The
in-depth discussion of erasure from other future-relevant fields,
such as value, lockTime and MiningData, as well as
from parts of transaction and block hashes (where data could be
inserted using brute-force methods), exceeds the scope of this
paper. The listed fields are currently less relevant in practice
and local erasure from them can conceivably be realized with
only minor adaptations to the strategies we introduce here.
C. Erasing Transaction Parts
Our main use case are scenarios in which the desire to
erase part of a transaction, such as a transaction output, arises
some time after the respective transaction has been included
on the active chain. Here, the data is already stored locally
by full nodes when the need to erase it arises. Arbitrary data
on blockchains is often not discovered immediately, but only
after careful analysis (such as in [20]) or media reporting.
Data erasure requests as per GDPR (cf. Sec. V-B) are another
context in which the need to erase usually arises some time
after the data in question has been included on the blockchain.
With FPLE, the node operator can mark transaction parts
as erased whenever deemed necessary by him. As a result of
marking a part X of a locally stored transaction T as erased:
• T is stored in the erasure database, with X overwritten
by substitute values, yielding T ′.
• From its original storage locations, T is physically erased
or overwritten with T ′ in such a way that it cannot be
reconstructed.
• Operations depending on stored transactions consult the
erasure database to ensure that relevant input data hasn’t
been erased. If it has been erased, the stored redacted
transaction (such as T ′) is used for subsequent operations.
6 Outputs with a scriptPubKey that always returns false, for all
possible scriptSig.
This is especially interesting in the case of unspent
transaction outputs (UTXOs).
The steps of erasure are also visualized in Fig. 3. Conceptu-
ally, the erasure database is a key-value store mapping TXIDs
to redacted transactions, i. e., for the transaction T with TXID
iT it stores the tuple (iT , T ′). Additional data, such as the
hash of the transaction’s block, can be included as well in a
practical implementation.
User input: erase parts X of
transaction T with TXID iT
Construct T ′ from T such that X ̸⊂ T ′
Store T ′ in erasure database with key iT
Physically remove T from local storage
Figure 3. Erasure of transaction parts.
D. Validating with Erased Data
In Sec. III-B we discussed the existence of future-relevant
data fields that might be needed for validating later blocks.
This is challenging when erasing, as, e. g., spendable UTXOs
can easily contain erasure-worthy data [20]. Naively erasing
an UTXO opens up the danger that future transactions (and
hence, blocks) will not be deemed correct by the erasing node,
leading to a fork. We propose to pragmatically defuse this
challenge (and avoid the fork) by locally enforcing two simple
rules:
1) Unconfirmed transactions that reference erased data (typi-
cally transaction outputs) are always considered invalid
and not relayed to other peers.
2) For confirmed transactions, the SPV heuristic is used for
all aspects of transactions that cannot be verified due to
previously erased data. That is, it is assumed that if the
transaction was included in a block, some miner deemed
it to be correct and the transaction is therefore likely to
remain part of the consensus.
See also Fig. 4 for a visualization of the proposed validation
logic. Note that in various more specific cases, and potentially
also in the general case that is in focus here, the proposed
validation logic can be further extended to eliminate the reliance
on the SPV heuristic. We discuss approaches towards this goal
in Sec. III-F.
E. Security Implications of SPV Fallback
We will now discuss the implications of FPLE for the
security of the erasing node and the overall blockchain system.
Specifically, the rules proposed in Sec. III-D enable a scenario
Received transaction
T with TXID iT
(e. g., as part of block)
iT is in
erasure
database?
Don’t store
or process
T , forget it
immediately
T depends
on erased
data?
Validate
and store
T as usual
T is mined
to chain?
Assume T is valid,
store as usual
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
Figure 4. Validation of incoming transactions.
where a transaction Ts is considered invalid by non-erasing
nodes but valid by some erasing nodes. In the following, we
assume that Ts attempts to spend from an output of transaction
Te with an invalid input script, and that some nodes erase
precisely the output of Te that is referenced by Ts’s invalid
input script. See also Fig. 5 for a diagram-based representation
of this scenario and its implications.
The described scenario becomes controversial only in the
case that some miner included the ("invalid") Ts in a block Bs.
Note that due to rule 1, Bs can be mined only by a dishonest
or non-validating miner. As we will see shortly, the miner
of Bs risks losing his block reward as the fork he causes is
unlikely to succeed.
Should such a block Bs nevertheless be mined, the im-
plications depend on whether a deciding majority of nodes,
i. e., a group of miners with sufficient consensus weight to
unilaterally perpetuate the longest chain, have also erased the
relevant transaction output of Te.
a) No deciding majority erased the relevant transaction
output: The problematic block Bs will not become part of the
global consensus. An erasing node might, however, act on the
belief that Ts is valid, making is susceptible to a double-spend
Transaction Ts spends from Te, but
spend is only valid if Te has been erased
Ts is mined
to chain?
Every honest
node discards Ts
A deciding
majority
erased Te?
The network
accepts that
Ts is valid
Nodes that erased Te consider Ts valid
as long as it’s part of the longest chain
no
yes
yes
no
Figure 5. Implications of spending from erased outputs.
attack on funds locked in erased UTXOs. Again, a prerequisite
for this attack is the mining of an invalid block that will be
rejected by the deciding majority—a high economic cost. The
costs for the attack can be increased further by waiting for a
number of confirmations before trusting the block, a measure
that is recommended even when running a regular non-erasing
full node [14].
b) A deciding majority erased the relevant transaction
output: The crafted spending transaction Ts and the block Bs
including it will become part of the longest chain. The funds
locked by the erased data in Te will effectively become stolen,
i. e., transferred without correct credentials. For decentralized
systems like Bitcoin, the probability of such a scenario taking
place in practice are arguably small (off-chain consensus and
cooperation are notoriously difficult). Still, we would argue:
• If the UTXO was erased because it contains data whose
possession and redistribution is illegal or considered
unwanted by a deciding majority, the recipient of the
funds arguably has no claim to being protected by the
network. Recipients usually provide key input to forming
transaction outputs (e. g., their cryptocurrency address)
and are free to choose whether they accept a non-standard
UTXO as payment or not.
• If the UTXO was erased because a user rightfully
requested it, for example when considering requests for the
removal of privacy-relevant data (cf. Sec. V-B), the user
is removing his consent for the use of that data. By doing
so, he is also accepting any potential consequences to the
security of his own funds that result from the erasure.
• In any case, if a deciding majority considers that an output
should henceforth be viewed as "anyone-can-spend" (by
erasing it locally), this is arguably an argument in itself
for accepting this view as consensus.
Also note that fund owners are always free to move their funds
to a "safer" location, should a relevantly broad consensus for
an erasure become likely.
F. Towards Trustless Validation
The FPLE approach outlined so far implies a trade-off
between the erasure of some data and the ability to gaplessly
validate the complete blockchain and transaction graph. As
pointers for subsequent works, we will now discuss how erasure
could be realized without introducing validation gaps that must
be bridged by the SPV heuristic or other forms of trust.
Tailored erasure mechanisms are possible in reply to various
specific data storage approaches. In Bitcoin, for example,
around 99%7 of UTXOs are based on a pay-to-hash template:
their output scripts consist mostly of a cryptographic hash value
h. In order for a spend to be successful, some part Xs of the
provided scriptSig (such as a public key or a piece of script
code) must, upon hashing, result in h, i. e., the spend is only
valid if hash(Xs) = h. If h has been erased, this check cannot
be performed and an SPV approach must be used. However, an
integrated implementation can also submit h to a second round
of hashing before erasing it, storing the resulting h′ := hash(h)
in its erasure database. Being the output of a cryptographic
hash function, h′ is unlikely to contain problematic data (the
likelihood can be further reduced by using a salt value during
hashing). It is furthermore unfeasible to reconstruct h with
only knowledge of h′. Having stored h′ for each erased h, the
local validation rules can now be extended to also submit the
relevant parts of proposed input scripts to a second round of
hashing, comparing the result with the stored h′. If testing that
hash(Xs) = h is not possible due to an erased h, the erasing
node can instead check whether hash(hash(Xs)) = h′. This
allows for a fully independent and "trustless" validation, i. e.,
without resorting to the SPV heuristic. While a similar strategy
can also be applied in other scenarios (e. g., when considering
data encoded in the last bits of transaction or block hashes), the
specifics depend heavily on the individual validation context.
A more universally applicable approach towards trustless
validation with erased data is conceivable as well. Before era-
sure, impacted data could be transformed using an appropriate
homomorphic encryption scheme so that its reconstruction is
impossible while relevant validation operations can still be
performed in a trustless manner (by analogously encrypting
the input data and completing the operation within the homo-
morphic system). We leave the thorough investigation of this
promising (albeit more complex) approach to follow-up works.
G. (Not) Receiving Data and Bootstrapping New Nodes
So far we focused on the case that the desire to erase a chunk
of data arises some time after it has been received, stored and
locally validated. Once some data has been processed and has
been marked as erased, there is no need to request it again
7 Based on the state of the UTXO set in October 2017 [8].
from other nodes. However, a node operator might be aware of
problematic data in some block or transaction that he doesn’t
yet store, e. g., when bootstrapping a new node that still hasn’t
synced to the rest of the network. We see two solutions to
enabling FPLE in this scenario—accepting the storage for a
short duration, and obtaining relevant erasure database entries
from a trusted party.
In practice, depending on the reasons for erasure, it might
be acceptable to willingly request and store problematic data
for a very short duration, with the sole goal of validating it
once and then discarding it. Since the receipt, processing and
erasure of the data is automatized, with no possibility for the
node operator to later extract the problematic data, such an
approach might be applicable even in cases where the legal
obligation for erasure exists. Clearly, the applicability of this
reasoning is highly dependent on the individual case.
Should even the receipt of certain transactions or blocks be
undesired (or impossible, e.g., if all reachable nodes already
erased them), a remaining solution is to obtain erasure database
entries from a trusted party. As discussed in Sec. III-C for
the case of erasing transaction outputs, an erasure database
entry consists of the TXID iT of a transaction T containing
problematic data and a modified version of that transaction T ′
that doesn’t include the problematic data, i. e., the tuple (iT , T ′).
Notably, the trusted source of such entries must be trusted to
leave non-problematic outputs of T in their original form
when constructing T ′, as otherwise the validation challenges
discussed in Sec. III-D will unnecessarily be extended to them.
In some scenarios, such as when strong legal obligations for
erasure exists (e. g., when the rights of the child are threatened;
cf. Sec. V-A), it is conceivable that a well regulated public
institution performs the role of trusted erasure database source,
reducing the practical risks of erasure without validation.
IV. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT APPLICATION TO BITCOIN
We now introduce a proof-of-concept implementation8 of
FPLE for Bitcoin targeting current versions9 of the Bitcoin Core
node software implementation, also known as bitcoind. Our
main goal is to demonstrate the practical feasibility of FPLE.
We also hope to provide groundwork for the development of a
more general erasure tool for node operators.
A. Overview and Scope
Our proposal for implementing FPLE for production use is
to modify existing node software such as bitcoind, extending
it with an erasure database and suitable hooks in the validation
process. For our proof-of-concept, we explored an alternative,
less invasive instantiation of FPLE that enables the erasure of
already stored transaction outputs without requiring changes to
the bitcoind binary. We chose this approach because it allows
for a quicker validation of our general FPLE proposal.
Our tool works by modifying existing data stores of bitcoind
in such a way that selected transaction outputs are (1) pruned
from the raw block storage and (2) their scriptPubKeys
8 https://github.com/marfl/bitcoind-erase
9 We validated our implementation against version 0.17.1.
are overwritten in the local UTXO database to the equivalent
of "any input can spend". Selected outputs’ original contents
are erased while the local node stays in sync with the network
even if any of the outputs becomes spent.
A major constraint of our current implementation is its
reliance on existing pruning logic for erasing from bitcoind’s
raw block store. Building upon bitcoind’s built-in pruning
functionality leads to the following specific constraints:
• More data is erased than required as bitcoind’s pruning
functionality erases all blocks up to a target height. Our
tool is therefore currently usable only when full blockchain
archival and indexing is not a requirement. Notably
however, nodes still validate the whole blockchain.
• Full erasure of an output can happen only after the node is
fully synced up to the point where the output is "buried"
under 300 blocks, i. e. not sooner than roughly 50 hours
after content has been included on the active chain.
Additionally, since we can’t guarantee that transactions
spending from erased outputs are ignored when building
blocks, our current implementation should not be used with
mining nodes. Lastly, our tool can currently safely erase only
transaction outputs that are not SegWit outputs. For supporting
the erasure of SegWit outputs, modifications of bitcoind are
currently unavoidable. More background on SegWit-support
and other implementation details is given in Sec. IV-C.
B. Proof-of-Concept in Action
Introducing our tool’s functionality through an example, we
will now describe how we erased transaction c206e10. We
also erased several other transactions from our node that we
discovered during our research and consider undesirable to store
and distribute. We choose not to discuss these transactions here
due to ethical and legal considerations. However, we would
argue that with its capability for erasure, and since we already
erased all problematic transactions known to us, our node is
the first full Bitcoin node that is free from existential legal
risks related to the storage of potentially problematic data.
Transaction c206e is included on the active mainnet chain
in block 892a011. It has 155 outputs, two of which were spent
at the time of writing. When interpreted as a JPEG, the outputs’
payload combines to a humorous image of a young muscular
man wearing a face-covering gas mask and sunglasses. When
interpreted as text, the transactions’ outputs furthermore contain
the message "Hi mom! I love you.".
We started syncing our node from the genesis block, and
shortly after receiving block 892a0 paused our node and
marked c206e’s outputs for erasure, to simulate the case that
the transaction has just been included on chain and none of its
outputs are spent. We marked all 155 outputs of c206e for
erasure. The relevant portion of our tool’s configuration file is
provided below (edited for brevity):
10Full TXID: c206e8fff656f07b27dac831ef9b956792bae4e7-
6a2cb43f14f49f0298bf2c2f.
11Full block hash: 000000000000000005694b14df70b8dbdb8e-
0c92234f5d30209781c0941892a0.
{
"bitcoind_dir" : "~/.bitcoin/",
"chain" : "mainnet",
"erase" : {
"00000...892a0" : {
"c206e...f2c2f" : [0, 1, 2, ..., 153, 154]
},
...
}
}
All transaction outputs of c206e follow the Pay-to-
PubKeyHash (P2PKH) template and therefore have an output
script of the form:
scriptPubKey: OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <X>
OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
With X being used here as a placeholder for 20 bytes of data
(different for each output). Typically, X is the hash of the public
key that needs to be provided in order to spend the output.
For most outputs in c206e, however, it is likely that since
they contain meaningful JPEG data, no public key is currently
known that is able to hash to their payload and therefore would
enable spending the associated outputs. While theoretically
spendable, transaction outputs containing arbitrary data are
therefore very unlikely to be spent in the foreseeable future.
The observation that this is commonly the case when arbitrary
data is included in transaction outputs motivated our pragmatic
"any input can spend" replacement approach. Implemented
in our proof-of-concept, transaction outputs marked in the
configuration (here: all transaction outputs of c206e) are
modified so that their scriptPubKey becomes of the form:
scriptPubKey: OP_TRUE
The TRUE opcode pushes a 1 to the stack. Since it is the
only opcode in the output script, any scriptSig that doesn’t
deliberately add termination conditions (regular input scripts
don’t) will lead to a positive evaluation and therefore the ability
to spend. We can confirm that rewriting outputs in this way
effectively prevents cases in which the local node becomes out-
of-sync because it can’t validate mined transactions spending
from erased outputs. We validated the claim using automated
regression tests described in Sec. IV-C as well as through
manual mainnet experiments like the one described here with
transaction c206e. Following the erasure of c206e’s outputs,
we resumed our node, which then successfully synced to the
network (despite two spends from erased outputs of c206e).
At the time of writing, our node has been running without
intervention for more than 2 months, remaining in sync with
the network and fully validating all incoming blocks.
C. Implementation Details
We now touch upon several potentially interesting implemen-
tation details related to bitcoind storage locations, automated
tests and SegWit support.
1) Data storage locations: According to our analysis of its
code base and data folder structure, bitcoind stores potentially
relevant blockchain data in the following locations (relative to
its data folder):
• blocks/: Raw block data stored in a custom data format.
Our tool erases from this location using bitcoind’s built-in
pruning functionality.
• chainstate/: LevelDB database storing different as-
pects of the current blockchain state. Most importantly,
this chainstate database holds a full copy of the current
UTXO set, i. e., all current UTXOs. It is in this database
that our tool erases the payload of UTXOs marked for
erasure, by overwriting their scriptPubKey.
• indexes/txindex/: An optional transaction index
database that is not maintained when pruning is enabled
and we therefore ignored in our implementation.
• mempool.dat: A collection of transactions that are not
yet included on the active chain but are valid and likely to
be included soon. We ignore this data store here, focusing
instead on the use-case of erasing data after it has been
included on the active chain.
• Wallet-related files and logs, which we also ignore because
they are trivially erased if necessary.
2) Validation through automated tests: We developed an
extensive test suite that leverages bitcoind’s regression testing
mode. Among other things, we automatically validate that:
• Blocks containing erased transactions are not stored in
the raw blocks storage, are not requested from peers and
are not shared with peers.
• Erased transaction outputs are either not stored in the
chainstate database or stored in the aforementioned
modified form.
• Transactions with erased outputs are also not obtainable
via bitcoind’s RPC API.
• Mined blocks containing transactions that spend from
erased outputs are regularly accepted.
3) SegWit support: Segregated Witness (SegWit) [18] is
a recent change to the Bitcoin protocol introducing a new
witness structure that, for some transaction outputs, needs to
be provided in addition to the scriptSig. While the change
is orthogonal to our general FPLE approach, it has direct
implications for our current proof-of-concept implementation.
In bitcoind version 0.17.1 (and possibly others), if witness data
was provided for spending an output, it must be used during
the validation. Otherwise the validation fails. When spending
from SegWit UTXOs, witness data is provided together with
a scriptSig, i. e., it can’t be influenced at the time of
erasing. Pragmatic workarounds towards ignoring the script
contained in the witness are possible, e. g., by manipulating
the SegWit version byte stored in scriptPubKey. However,
with the validation rules currently implemented in bitcoind,
validation also fails if the spending of such a modified (a
now obviously SegWit-based) output is attempted by a pre-
SegWit (legacy) input with nonzero scriptSig. A different
rewriting approach is therefore needed for erasing SegWit
outputs than for erasing pre-SegWit outputs. Unfortunately, a
commonly used template is to nest SegWit-spendable outputs
in a (legacy) Pay-to-Script-Hash (P2SH) output, which makes
them indistinguishable from legacy P2SH transaction outputs.
SegWit-related challenges can easily be surmounted when
implementing FPLE by directly modifying the validation rules
in bitcoind. Motivated by our own erasure goals, our non-
invasive proof-of-concept focuses on the safe erasure of outputs
that are clearly not SegWit-based, such as P2PKH outputs.
V. WHY WOULD SOMEONE WANT TO ERASE?
In the following, we give an in-depth motivation of why
the availability of a pragmatic local erasure solution is highly
desirable for node operators in practice. An overview over
potential negative implications of arbitrary data storage on
public blockchains like Bitcoin can be found in [20]. There,
Matzutt et al. conclude that participation in blockchain-based
systems could be considered illegal once illegal content has
been included on-chain. Based on our own legal analysis, how-
ever, we argue that liability can be avoided if no problematic
data is actually stored or distributed, which can be achieved at
the node-individual level using FPLE.
We explain our reasoning at the example of criminal law
with respect to the storage and distribution of problematic
images. We then briefly touch upon data protection law and
point out other legal and non-legal reasons for the desirability
of erasure. While our specific legal arguments are rooted in EU
law they are likely transferable to various similar jurisdictions.
A. Criminal Law
According to the prevailing narrative, full nodes store the
whole blockchain, which is public, immutable and cannot be
erased. The implication is that they potentially also store and
distribute data of which the storage and distribution is illegal.
However, criminal liability could be avoided if immediate
deletion of such data was possible.
The question of deleting data from the blockchain gains
urgent practical significance as images containing juvenile
pornographic content might already be included on the Bitcoin
blockchain [20]. Additionally, no possibility is apparent for
preventing people from adding illegal content to the Bitcoin
blockchain in the future (cf. Sec. II).
The possession and distribution of child and juvenile
pornography is subject to criminal liability in most jurisdictions.
Although, to the best of our knowledge, no court has decided
on the liability of full node operators for images stored on the
blockchain yet, legal grounds for operating a Bitcoin full node
are precarious.
A possible legal solution to the matter can be found within
EU law. It might be possible to apply Art. 14 of the E-
Commerce Directive [10] to blockchain full nodes. The article
was drafted for information society services, services such as
hosting providers that store information originally provided by
recipients of the service. [10, Art. 14] provides a safe harbour
for such services. Pursuant to this legal norm, the provider
of the service is not liable for the information stored at the
request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: “(a) the
provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or
information [. . . ]” or “(b) the provider, upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to
disable access to the information”.
Whether the safe harbour of Art. 14 E-Commerce Directive
is available for blockchain full nodes is under legal debate [3],
with no court rulings known to the authors. Provided that [10,
Art. 14] can be applied to blockchain full nodes, the argument
can be made that the operator of the blockchain full node can
only be held criminally liable if he has actual knowledge of the
possession and distribution of the incriminating image. Whether
actual knowledge can be assumed depends on individual
circumstances. However, also under [10, Art. 14], the node
operator is obliged to erase the relevant data once they are
informed of its existence in order to avoid criminal liability.
Only disabling access to data containing child and juvenile
pornography, without physically erasing it, would be insufficient
to comply with the law as knowing possession remains a
criminal offence.
B. Privacy and Data Protection
As also mentioned in Sec. II-A, achieving strong privacy-
guarantees for data included on a public blockchain is non-
trivial from a technical standpoint. If no explicit precautions
are taken, which appears to be the norm [22], confidentiality of
transactions is next to not given [7], [15]. The issue is further
compounded when considering non-financial use-cases or the
deliberate posting of privacy-relevant data without consent, e. g.,
as part of a doxing. Contemporary data protection standards
demand that network participants can also erase data already
shared with them, a requirement that is at odds with the
notorious "impossibility" of erasure from blockchains [4].
Pursuant to Art. 17 of the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) [11] every data subject has the right to be
forgotten, meaning the right to obtain from the data controller
the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without
undue delay [11, Art. 17]. This right is subject to certain
prerequisites and certain exceptions (see [11, Art. 17] for
details). According to the prevailing opinion, compliance with
the duty to erase is given if the information embodied in the
data cannot be recovered without disproportionate effort [17].
Whether blockchain full node operators can be defined as
data controllers is, however, legally contested [24], [4]. The
realization that local erasure is possible, however, contributes
significantly to the legal discussion on who the data controller
in a blockchain system is and who can therefore be made
responsible for deletion.
The right to be forgotten is the most striking deletion-related
conflict point between common blockchain protocols and the
GDPR. However, other norms of the GDPR, for example the
necessity of consent for the processing of data [11, Art. 6],
could also be in conflict with the features of blockchain full
nodes, leading to more potential reasons why full nodes might
need to erase personal data stored on the blockchain.
C. Further Legal, Ethical and Social Norms
The criminal law and data protection norms mentioned above
are only a small selection of legal reasons for the importance
of the possibility of at least local deletion of content from a
blockchain full node. Similar legal problems exist concerning
intellectual property rights (where host providers need to be
able to respond to takedown requests), defamation, and malware
distribution, to name just a few examples (an overview can
also be found in [20]).
Popular public networks like Bitcoin extend worldwide,
spanning over a multitude of jurisdictions, but also over diverse
individuals subject to different ethical, religious and social
norms. Local erasure is therefore not only necessary for legal
reasons, but also desirable for full node operators to avoid
storing and distributing content that is in conflict with their
individual norms and values, even when no network-wide
consensus on norms and values exists.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the following, we discuss difficult-to-measure implications
of FPLE for existing blockchain networks.
A. Network Resilience
As observed in Sec. II, it is likely impossible to completely
restrict the encoding of arbitrary data on a public blockchain
like Bitcoin, and that it is therefore unavoidable that ob-
jectionable data (e. g., child pornography, sensitive personal
data) will at some point be included, be it deliberately or
by accident. For example, malicious actors might deliberately
include illegal content on a blockchain, with the goal of causing
legal insecurity for node operators and thus damaging the
network [20]. FPLE protects against this risk: node operators
can erase problematic data locally and in this way remain
compliant, even if the data is still formally "on the chain" and
perhaps stored on other nodes in the network.
Reducing individual legal risks is central for maintaining
large numbers of full nodes and therefore a healthy blockchain
network and ecosystem. Even more so in situations where
compliance is pursued and the identity of node operators is
well known, as when considering businesses depending on
full node functionality (exchanges, online wallets) or federated
systems like Stellar [21].
B. Global Erasure
In this paper, we focus on enabling local erasure. Our main
argument for the desirability of a local erasure possibility is
that reasons for erasure are highly individual, making global
consensus on this topic difficult and the enforcement of a
unified global policy potentially undesirable.
In cases where a global consensus about the erasure of a
given data chunk does exist, FPLE can also scale to global
erasure as individual node operators implement similar erasure
decisions. We argue that without such off-chain consensus, no
effective global erasure is possible with whatever technical
means. Individual nodes always retain the possibility to keep
data that they already store (possibly in secret), and can’t, in
general, prove they have forgotten it.
C. Censorship
As a potential downside, the possibility for local erasure
could be viewed as an enabler for censorship in oppressive
regimes, as forcing the erasure of blockchain data becomes
decoupled from the collateral damage of having to altogether
forbid the operation of a node. We believe that the increased
flexibility for node operators outweighs such risks and note
that the discussion is similar to considering the tainting of
cryptocurrency-denominated crime proceeds [1].
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we question the common narrative that erasure
is not possible for node operators in existing blockchain
networks like Bitcoin. In contrast to existing erasure approaches
attempting to erase data globally from all nodes, we propose a
pragmatic local erasure solution. Our functionality-preserving
local erasure (FPLE) approach empowers node operators to
remove problematic transaction parts from local storage, with
minimal impact to their capacity to support the network
and autonomously validate further transactions. Challenging
implications of erasure, such as the potential inability to validate
some new transactions, are diffused by a set of simple rules
that weaken security guarantees only for transactions directly
referencing erased data. We demonstrate the non-invasive
applicability of our solution to existing protocols using a
proof-of-concept implementation for Bitcoin. We argue that
by enabling local erasure, we enable blockchain networks to
embrace a larger range of legal norms and individual values
and to therefore truly become global networks.
Building upon the proposed approach, possible next steps
include the investigation of fully trustless approaches towards
FPLE, e. g., based on homomorphic encryption. We will also
further validate the application of FPLE to other blockchain
architectures, towards enabling local erasure in further popular
networks such as Ethereum and Stellar.
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